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Optimjack: The Supply-Chain Attack That Served Malware From IKEA, the BBC, Zoom and 175 Other Trusted Websites

Thumbnail for: Optimjack: The Supply-Chain Attack That Served Malware From IKEA, the BBC, Zoom and 175 Other Trusted Websites

Case file — Optimjack: On Monday, November 16, 2026, visitors to some of the most-visited websites in the world were served malware from a file those sites already trusted. An attacker had written malicious code into the Optimizely Web projects of at least 178 organisations — among them IKEA, the BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, HSBC, Equifax and Ledger — so that each site's own Optimizely snippet delivered a payload that swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses, skimmed payment cards, stole cookies and screenshots, and routed iPhone and iPad visitors to exploit kits. Scott Helme of Report URI, who uncovered and documented the campaign, found the code in 188 of the 1,611 Optimizely snippets his team fetched. Optimizely says an unauthorised party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation account signup flow to add the code. How that produced write access to 178 unrelated customers' projects has not been explained. By 21:52 UTC on November 16, all but one of the infected snippets had been cleaned. Status: contained; the scale of what was taken from visitors is still unknown.

How the code got in

Optimizely Web Experimentation is an A/B testing service. Each customer embeds a small JavaScript file — the snippet — served from cdn.optimizely.com and loaded on every page of their site. Inside each project sits a field called Project JavaScript, where the customer can add custom code that runs for every visitor. According to Report URI's analysis, the attacker wrote their code into that field, project after project, and left the rest of each snippet untouched. The file itself was not altered in transit, and this was not a cache-poisoning attack: Optimizely's servers delivered exactly what the projects contained, from Optimizely's own domain, over a valid TLS connection, from a host every affected site had already chosen to trust. Optimizely's own websites, www.optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com, carried the code too.

Report URI saw three versions of the injected loader. The first was a plain script tag pointing at the attacker's server, 1688360[.]cc. The second hid the same address in Base64, which a simple text search for the domain misses. The third carried a full copy of the payload inside the snippet itself, so it still ran if the attacker's server was blocked. One customer's snippet, Smartsheet's, was cleaned and then infected again with the hidden version — which, as Report URI notes, means whoever wrote the code still had access while the cleanup was under way.

Optimizely told BleepingComputer that "an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow" and used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. The company has not described the flaw, has not said when it was first exploited, and has not explained the step that matters most: how a weakness in a signup flow became write access to the projects of 178 separate customers. Report URI puts the possibilities plainly — a compromised Optimizely system, a credential with access across customers, or something else — and notes the answer is Optimizely's to give.

What the payload did

Every infected snippet loaded the same second-stage script, track.js, hosted at 1688360[.]cc. It was a self-contained file of roughly 30 KB, and the attacker rebuilt it 26 times during the day, adding features and wallet addresses as they went. All of its functions ran at once, on every page that carried the snippet.

Wallet swapping. The script recognised valid cryptocurrency addresses for eight chains — Bitcoin, Ethereum and other EVM chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin — checked their checksums, and replaced them with the attacker's addresses in page text, form fields, links, outgoing requests and the clipboard. A visitor who copied a wallet address from an affected page could paste the attacker's instead.

Card skimming. Added to the payload at 13:43 UTC, this component watched form submissions for a card number (validated with the Luhn check), an expiry date and a security code, and sent all three to the attacker's server using navigator.sendBeacon. Cards typed into a payment provider's hosted field — Stripe's or Adyen's, for example — sit in the provider's own frame and were out of reach. Cards typed into a site's own form fields were not.

Cookies and screenshots. When the script swapped an address near wallet or payment wording, it also sent the page address, the cookies a script is allowed to read, the original addresses it had replaced, and a rendered image of the page. Any session token sitting in a cookie without the HttpOnly flag was exposed to it.

iPhone and iPad exploit kits. On Apple mobile devices, the payload loaded router scripts from two .icu domains in a hidden frame. The routers fingerprinted the iOS version and served the Coruna exploit kit to iOS 13 through 17 and the DarkSword kit to iOS 18. Both are serious frameworks — Coruna, disclosed by Google's Threat Intelligence Group and iVerify in March 2026, chains 23 exploits; DarkSword covers iOS 18.4 to 18.7 — but both rely on flaws Apple had already fixed: the kits' own comments put devices on iOS 18.7.3 or later, and 26.3 or later, outside their range. Hudson Rock recorded the routers serving their entry pages and stresses that this shows delivery. No successful compromise of a real device has been demonstrated.

Timeline of November 16

Time (UTC)Development
Nov 13 onwardAn earlier wave from the same actor: a loader served from webshell[.]lol appears in scripts from three other providers — Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media — on sites including Security Bank, the Frankfurter Allgemeine, the Sydney Morning Herald, vidaXL and Fox Sports (Hudson Rock).
Nov 16, 04:21First Optimizely injection Report URI saw, in the BBC's snippet.
Nov 16, 13:03Stolen funds begin to be swept from the attacker's wallets to exchanges.
Nov 16, 13:43The card-skimming component is added to the payload.
Nov 16, ~15:00Researcher Amirul Cyber publishes the first public write-up and names the campaign OPTIMJACK.
Nov 16, 17:13–17:57iPhone and iPad visitors on iOS 18.6 or earlier begin receiving the hidden exploit frame.
Nov 16, 19:25Report URI puts the cryptocurrency received by the attacker's wallets at about $7,040, all within roughly nine hours.
Nov 16, 20:10Scott Helme raises the alarm publicly on X.
Nov 16, 20:40–21:10Mass cleanup of infected snippets.
Nov 16, 21:52One of 188 infected snippets still carries the code — TalkTalk's.
Nov 16, 22:49Report URI publishes its full analysis.
Nov 17, 01:02Optimizely's status page confirms the incident.

Who was hit

Report URI fetched 1,611 Optimizely snippets it could find and kept a copy of each of the 188 infected ones, belonging to 178 organisations. It says the real number is likely higher, because not every customer's snippet is discoverable from outside. By sector, the largest groups were banking and finance (32 organisations, including HSBC in 11 markets, Equifax, ABN AMRO and Paychex), technology and software (23, including Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab and Optimizely itself), and retail and fashion (20, including IKEA, ASOS, Mattel and American Eagle), followed by streaming and entertainment (12, including Peacock), news and media (10, including CNN, the BBC and Fox News), airlines and travel (9, including Air France-KLM), healthcare (8), telecoms (7) and crypto and trading (6, including the hardware-wallet maker Ledger). BleepingComputer independently confirmed the code loading, or attempting to load, on the sites of Zoom, KLM, GitLab, the BBC, CNN, Fox News, Salesforce and others.

IKEA appears in Report URI's list among the retail organisations, with an IKEA home design site among the properties reported to have served the code. IKEA told Reuters it was assessing whether its digital services or customers had been affected. That distinction matters, and it applies to every name on the list: Reuters noted it could not independently confirm that the malicious code led to successful attacks on each affected site, and none of the 178 organisations had its own systems breached — the compromise sat one level up, in a supplier they all shared. Ledger, for its part, confirmed on November 17 that the code had been removed from its site and stated the incident does not affect its devices or users' private keys.

The money question

The one loss figure that can be verified from outside is the cryptocurrency. Report URI traced about $7,040 to the attacker's wallets by 19:25 UTC on November 16, all of it received within roughly nine hours, with funds being swept onward to exchanges from 13:03 UTC. One of the wallets, on TRON, has been in use since March 2026, which suggests an operator who was active well before this campaign. Later on-chain reviews have put the confirmed total lower — Galaxy Digital's Alex Thorn counted roughly $2,300 across 19 fraudulent transactions — and the honest summary is that the confirmed crypto theft sits somewhere in the low thousands of dollars. Everything else the payload was built to take cannot be counted from outside: Report URI cannot see how many card numbers or cookies reached the attacker's server, and neither can anyone else except the attacker and, in time, the card networks and the affected sites' own logs. Treat the $7,040 as a floor for one revenue stream, not as the size of the incident.

Was the US bank outage connected?

The same Monday afternoon, customers of Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo and U.S. Bank reported being unable to log in or move money, and speculation linked the two events. The evidence points the other way. Chase said before 4 p.m. Eastern that its problem was "a software bug in on-premise hardware systems" and that there was "no evidence this is cyber-related." None of the outage banks appears in Report URI's list of 178 organisations. And the payload's economics argue against a link: a wallet swapper and a card skimmer earn only while customers can reach the site and pay. There is currently no evidence connecting the outage to Optimjack.

Optimizely's response

Optimizely confirmed the incident to BleepingComputer on November 16 and said the attackers exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation account signup flow. It says it blocked the vulnerable path, deployed a fix, removed the injected code, ended active sessions, revoked tokens and reset access for affected accounts, and its status page confirmed the incident at 01:02 UTC on November 17. The cleanup on the customer side was fast once it started: the count of infected snippets fell from 169 at about 20:56 UTC to one by 21:52 UTC. What Optimizely has not yet provided is an account of the intrusion itself — what the signup flaw was, when it was first used, and how it reached across customer boundaries. The company also confirmed earlier this year, in February 2026, that attackers had reached some of its internal systems through a voice-phishing attack; no researcher has linked that incident to this one, and it should not be treated as an explanation until someone does.

What to check now

If your organisation runs Optimizely Web, Report URI's advice is the starting point:

  • Read your own snippet. Open every project's Project JavaScript and every experiment's custom code and look for 1688360[.]cc, atob( and any script nobody on your team wrote. Check the snippet your visitors actually receive, including any copy served from your own domain.
  • Review who can write to it. List the users, API tokens and integrations with write access to your Optimizely account, remove anything you do not recognise, and rotate the rest.
  • Treat November 16 as exposure. Card numbers typed into your own form fields that day, and session tokens in cookies without the HttpOnly flag, should be treated as exposed.
  • Block the known infrastructure: 1688360[.]cc and webshell[.]lol, and watch for the Base64 form of the payload domain, which a plain text search will miss.
  • Constrain third-party scripts. On two affected sites, a content security policy stopped the payload from loading. A policy that lists the hosts your pages may load scripts from and send data to — with reporting switched on — is the control that fits a snippet that changes too often for integrity hashes.
  • Keep card entry in the payment provider's hosted field, where page scripts cannot reach it.

If you visited an affected site on November 16: update an iPhone or iPad to iOS 18.7.3 or iOS 26.3 or later; if you made a cryptocurrency transfer after copying an address from an affected page, verify it went to the address you intended; and watch the statements of any card you typed into a site's own checkout form that day.

What is still unknown

  • How the attacker got in — the route from a signup-flow flaw to write access across 178 customers is unexplained.
  • How long the access lasted before the first injection Report URI saw at 04:21 UTC on November 16.
  • Whether the same route served the earlier webshell[.]lol wave through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media; Hudson Rock links the waves through shared code and hosts, but the way in for each is unknown.
  • How many cards, cookies and screenshots were collected. Only the crypto receipts are visible from outside.
  • Whether any iPhone or iPad was actually compromised. Delivery of the exploit kits is documented; a successful exploit on a real device is not.
  • Who is behind it. No researcher has attributed the campaign.

One closing note for anyone checking whether the danger has passed: independent re-fetches in the early hours of November 17 found the sampled customer snippets clean, but the payload server itself, 1688360[.]cc, was still answering and still serving track.js. The snippet cleanup stops new infections from Optimizely's CDN; the attacker's infrastructure, and whatever it collected, remains theirs.

Sources

  • Report URI (Scott Helme), "World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely," November 16, 2026 — the primary investigation: snippet sweep, payload analysis, timeline and remediation advice.
  • BleepingComputer, "Optimizely supply chain attack infects major brands' sites with malware" — independent confirmation of the code loading on major sites, and Optimizely's statement on the signup-flow flaw and its remediation steps.
  • Hudson Rock, November 16, 2026 — recovery of eight poisoned files, the earlier webshell[.]lol wave through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media, and the iPhone exploit-loader delivery.
  • Amirul Cyber, November 16, 2026 — first public write-up; named the campaign OPTIMJACK; identified the two sites where a content security policy blocked the payload.
  • Reuters, November 16–17, 2026 — the 178-organisation framing, IKEA's response, and the caveat that successful compromise could not be confirmed for every site.
  • MATT Security, "OPTIMJACK: poisoned Optimizely scripts hit 178 brands" — sector breakdown and the bank-outage analysis.

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